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Background: Stroke services are a form of integrated care which have been introduced in many countries,
including the Netherlands, to improve health outcomes and processes of care by connecting the acute,
rehabilitative, and chronic phases of stroke care. Limited research exists on the effects of payment systems on the
functioning of integrated care services from the perspectives of those involved in providing, planning and
contracting the care. This qualitative study identified stakeholder views on i) challenges in integrated stroke care
associated with fee-for-service systems; ii) other possible financing models for stroke care, and iii) challenges in the
implementation of an integrated financing mechanism for stroke care.
Methods: Twenty-four participants were interviewed using face-to-face audio-recorded semi-structured interviews.
Respondents were purposively selected from five stakeholder groups; care providers, health care managers, health
insurers, experts and patient representatives. Transcribed data were coded and analysed to generate themes
relating to the study aims.
Results: Respondents mentioned the following challenges associated with the current fee-for-service system;
inappropriate incentives for cooperation, efficiency and improving quality and the inability to exert steering power
at the level of the stroke service. In addition, care is not patient-centred and the financing system is inflexible.
The respondents mentioned several solutions for the challenges, but there was no consensus amongst them.
Regarding the implementation of integrated financing, respondents mentioned the following general challenges;
a) the foundations of the financing system are incompatible with integrated financing, b) co-morbidity and c) the
lack of evidence on the effect of integrated financing. Stroke-specific challenges were; a) the diverse patient
population, b) a non-uniform care trajectory, c) unclear division of responsibility for the overall care and d) different
stages of development among stroke services.
Conclusions: This study provides new knowledge on stakeholder perception of the effect of payment systems
and financial incentives on cooperation processes, quality of care and cost-containment in integrated stroke care.
The results show that fee-for-service does not provide the right incentives for the integration of stroke care.
We recommend to perform financial experiments for integrated stroke care.
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The aging population, with its increase of patients in
need of complex care demands a new way of organising
health care [1]. The health care sector has to deal with
limited resources, while costs continue to rise. This
combination forces policy makers and health care plan-
ners to develop sustainable health care systems that can
deal with these factors in the future [2].
To improve the content of care, there has been an in-
creased focus on various approaches such as integrated
care [3]. Integrated care is supposed to ‘glue’ the entities
together, enabling it to achieve common goals and opti-
mal results [4].
To control the total costs of health care, many strat-
egies exist ranging from capping budgets and provider
payment strategies to increased consumer payments.
Despite numerous theoretical papers on this topic, no
one seemed to have found the holy grail yet. Currently,
payment reform is thought to have the highest potential
for cost savings in health care [5] and new strategies to
finance care are sought for [6-8]. While many papers
have been published discussing the theoretical effects of
provider payment on provider behaviour, practical evi-
dence is lacking to a large extent. Therefore, this study
was set up to provide more insight into the effects of
payments systems on the quality and costs of integrated
care, and to explore the opportunities of implementing
other financing systems.Stroke care
In this study, we focus on the financing of integrated
care specifically for stroke patients, because of the large
costs associated with this condition, and the multidiscip-
linary nature of stroke care. In Europe, the average an-
nual incidence of stroke is 141 per 100,000 for men, and
94 per 100,000 for women [9]. Stroke patients require
complex multidisciplinary rehabilitation and chronic
care, and the group of patients is expected to increase
with the aging population.Stroke services
Stroke services are a form of integrated care which have
been established during the last decade [10]. The aim of
stroke services is to improve health outcomes and pro-
cesses of care by connecting the acute, rehabilitative,
and chronic phase of stroke care [11,12]. In a typical
stroke service, the hospital, rehabilitation centre, nurs-
ing home and primary care providers are represented.
According to a modelling study in the Netherlands, the
use of stroke services compared to usual care could
achieve a 13% cost-reduction [13]. It is increasingly
recognized that the integration of care and cooperation
between different providers can be stimulated byenabling conditions in terms of policy, legislation and
financing [4,14].
The current provider payment for stroke care in the
Netherlands is a fragmented fee-for-service system; every
provider receives separate reimbursement for the care ac-
tivities delivered. Providers who form integrated pathways
are still reimbursed using the fee-for-service system.
Research aim and relevance
The aim of this study is to answer the following research
questions a) what do stakeholders identify as challenges
in integrated stroke care associated with fee-for-service
systems; b) what do stakeholders present as possible so-
lutions, and c) what do stakeholders identify as chal-




A qualitative research design was chosen in order to ob-
tain a full range of authentic participant views. Inter-
views were chosen as the method for data collection as
this is a suitable qualitative method to collect individual
experiences, perceptions and opinions of respondents.
Sampling
To achieve diversity of opinion, a purposive sampling
approach was used to recruit participants from each of
five stakeholder groups; care providers, health service
managers, health insurers, experts and the patient or-
ganisation. More details about the definition of the five
stakeholder groups is provided in the list below:
Care providers (n=4): clinicians with detailed knowledge
about the activities of at least one stroke service, and
working in the hospital, rehabilitation centre or nursing
home. Individuals in this group included rehabilitation
specialists, neurologists and an elderly care physician.
Health service managers (n=5): senior managers from
institutions that had clinicians involved in stroke
services. Individuals in this group included local health
service executives such as stroke care-coordinators, a
general manager of a care institution, a medical
director of a rehabilitation centre and a program
manager of the hospital.
Health insurers (n=4): senior employees from health
insurance companies involved in contracting care
services for secondary and primary care as well as
integrated care specifically.
Experts (n=9): policy makers and senior researchers
who worked in national institutions or universities with
a relationship to integrated care. Examples of these
institutions are those with a nation-wide strategic role
in health policy and planning, healthcare financing,
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development of clinical guidelines and protocols.
Patient representatives (n=2): representatives from the
national patient organisation for stroke.
For every category, the researchers selected potential par-
ticipants from three sources; 1) The Stroke Knowledge
Network Netherlands, 2) authors who recently published
in national or international journals, and 3) conference
speakers. Potential participants were selected for their
knowledge on the topic, and/or because of their status as
opinion-leaders in this field.
Recruitment
The potential participants were sent an email that
explained the research aims and asked for their participa-
tion. In case the contacted person considered a colleague
more knowledgeable about the topic, this person was
contacted instead. Additional participants were selected
one at a time to ensure maximum variation. Twenty-four
out of twenty-six (92%) contacted individuals consented to
participate. The self-reported reason for non-participation
by the two other participants, a care provider and an ex-
pert, was a lack of time to participate and insufficient
expertise.
Data collection
Twenty semi-structured face-to-face interviews with in
total twenty-four respondents (16 interviews with one
respondent and 4 with two respondents) using a topic
guide (included as Appendix) were conducted in Dutch
by one researcher (JT) at the interviewee’s place of work.
Related documents, provided by the respondents or pub-
licly available, were also checked for relevant informa-
tion and provided input for the interview topic list. The
interviewer had an academic background and was not
acquainted with the respondents prior to the interview.
The interviews were of 60 minutes duration and were
audio-recorded. Participants were asked for their views
on the influence of the current payment systems on the
functioning of stroke services and if they experienced
problems associated with the current payment system.
Participants were also asked to provide their opinions on
how current problems could be overcome and how pay-
ment could play a role in this. The final sample-size of
24 was reached by saturation of themes, that is, no new
insights were identified in the data.
Data analysis
Interviews were anonymised and transcribed verbatim to
produce transcripts of narrative text for thematic ana-
lysis. The transcripts were returned to the respondents
to check whether the transcribed data correctly reflectedtheir opinion and experiences. Following this, minor ad-
justments were made.
The main themes of interest, namely i) challenges as-
sociated with fee-for-service payments, ii) solutions for
these challenges and iii) challenges for integrated finan-
cing provided a framework for the initial categorisation
of text.
The allocation of text segments in the interviews to
these three main themes was performed by all three re-
searchers, whereby each segment was also coded as a
subtheme within the three main themes. The subthemes
were defined as ‘independent aspects not influenced by
other subthemes’. The process of generating subthemes
was inductive and iterative. The authors used seven ses-
sions during two months to come to consensus. Discrep-
ancies in themes between researchers were discussed
until agreement was reached.
Data were also analysed with the purpose to highlight
differences and convergences in responses from different
groups of stakeholders. However, few differences between
stakeholders were observed. Only where a difference in
opinion was apparent, this is reported. Participant narra-
tives have been used to illustrate meaning in the themes
and summaries.Participant consent
All participants were informed of the objective of the
study and that they were free to participate or withdraw
from the study at any given point. Participants gave ver-
bal consent to be interviewed and for the interviews to
be audio-recorded. Interviews were anonymized to en-
sure that data could not be traced back to an individual
respondent and confidentiality of the participants was
ensured. No formal ethics approval was requested, since
according to Dutch law, ethical approval is not necessary
for research concerning health professionals or experts.
The persons from patient organizations were interviewed
as representatives of their organization and not as patients.Results
Characteristics of the respondents
The twenty-four respondents consisted of nine women
and fifteen men. The number of years of relevant experi-
ence of the respondents ranged from 4 to 32 years.Question 1: Challenges associated with fee-for-service
The respondents identified several challenges in the
current organisation of integrated stroke care that were
related to the fee-for-service payments. The subthemes
that emerged were incentives, steering power, patient-
centred care and inflexibility of the financing mechanism.
Each theme is discussed below.
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All respondents mentioned that the current fee-for-service
payment system provides inappropriate or contradicting
incentives when it comes to integrated stroke care.
First of all, stakeholders mentioned that there is no fi-
nancial reason to cooperate. Several stakeholders com-
ment that the current system rewards individual acts, as
opposed to collective achievements, which does not pro-
vide an incentive to cooperate.
“At this moment, on the level of the stroke service,
there is no reward for an overall good result.”
[manager]
“Right now there is no incentive to cooperate, and
there are also no consequences if you do not
cooperate.” [expert]
Second, there is a tension between the own interest
and shared interest of the stakeholders involved in pro-
viding the care;
“I always say that the elastic of the individual providers
is stronger than the collective one. In the end of the day,
everyone first looks at their own interests.” [expert]
The focus on the organisation’s own interests seems to
be closely linked to a demand from the management
level to perform well;
“There is a need to focus on your own interest. Even
individual wards in the hospital need to make sure
they receive enough attention, to protect their right to
exist.”
Third, there is no incentive to be efficient; care pro-
viders are being paid a fixed amount and there is no
need felt to be more efficient than that. If certain pro-
viders want to become more efficient, the benefits are
not necessarily felt directly by them.
“An empty bed is a financial risk. There is an
incentive in the current system to ensure that your
beds are filled with patients who are entitled to receive
an additional fee. In this way, your unit has the best
figures.” [care provider]
Fourth, there is no financial incentive to work on im-
proving quality because the basis of financing is the
number of services provided.
Lastly, respondents mentioned the existence of oppos-
ing incentives even within organisations between the dif-
ferent groups of stakeholders such as care providers and
managers;“At the level of the care providers, I think everyone
finds cooperation self-evident. When you move one
level up to the managers and directors, you feel much
more competition. The care providers themselves are
not thinking of financial incentives. It is the managers
who are guilty of optimizing their own organization.”
[manager]
b) Steering power
Because of the individual payments of the institutions,
stakeholders said that it is not possible to steer or exert
control at the level of the stroke service. It is difficult to
address common issues such as quality or quantity of care
to cooperation partners. Also cooperation is thought to
improve when there is centralized steering.
“If you leave the issue of cooperation to the individual
organisations, then it won’t happen. You need the unit to
be directed as one piece, and you cannot expect that
from the individual organisations themselves.” [manager]
Several respondents mentioned that there is a need to
have one steering body or person, who both financially
and organisationally runs the stroke service in order to
remove current obstacles.
c) Patient-centred care
Because of the fragmented payments and demand-oriented
organisation of care, some stakeholders found that also the
care delivered to the patient becomes fragmented and less
patient-centred. When taking care of the patient, there is
less attention for the actual needs of the patient, and the
focus is on the delivery of services instead:
“Providing care is not custom-made yet. Many services
are being offered to the patient, while perhaps this
patient doesn’t need all those services. The financing is
based on the diagnosis, and not on the needs of the
patient.” [insurer]
At the same time, stakeholders mention that the forma-
tion of a stroke service specifically for stroke patients
might not result in optimal patient-centred care;
“Creating a specific stroke service might be attractive for
some patients, however this results in the care provider
focussing only on the ‘stroke’ elements. If you make it a
‘chronic care service’, then you are creating much more
coherence in all the care for the patient.” [expert]d) Inflexibility of the financing mechanism
Respondents said the current payment system is inflex-
ible when it comes to innovations in care, and shifting
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addition, the separate fee-for-service financing was said to
have a negative effect on the dynamic processes in the
stroke service that you aim to achieve by integrating care.
“The financing mechanism should be arranged in such
a way that there is money not only to structurally
finance the same system, but there should be money
available to see how we can constantly improve the
system.” [expert]
Also, there are certain elements of the stroke service which
cannot be financed using the traditional fee-for-service
system;
“Overarching functions such as a chain-care
coordinator are not structurally embedded in the
current financing system, because it is unclear who
should receive payment for this.” [manager]
To summarize, the respondents said that the current
fee-for-service system provides inappropriate incentives
for cooperation, efficiency and improving quality. An-
other challenge mentioned was the inability to exert
control at the level of the stroke service because of the
financing of the separate entities. In addition, the care is
less patient-centred and the financing mechanism is
considered inflexible.
An interesting finding was that in contrast to the ex-
periences of the care providers, experts, insurers and
managers, the representatives of the patient organisation
reported that most of these issues go unnoticed by pa-
tients themselves:
“I feel that all the organisational issues are not even
noticed by the patient. Of course you hear on the radio
or television about issues such as waiting times, or
that the care is too costly. But when you are a patient,
these discussions are not relevant, and you are not
even aware of them. Your first priority is to regain very
basic skills, such as reaching your mouth with a fork
again.” [patient representative]
Question 2: Possible solutions for financing stroke care
To explore other ways of financing integrated stroke care,
we asked the respondents whether they saw possible solu-
tions to the issues mentioned above. The respondents
elaborated upon a) several models to finance stroke care
and b) entitlements to ensure reimbursement for the
stroke services used.
a) Models for financing
Respondents came up with ideas for different financing
models (Figure 1). There was no consensus amongst therespondents regarding an optimal financing mechanism;
several different options were mentioned.
In Model 1, the fee-for-service system is largely main-
tained, but an additional cooperation fee is added which is
to cover cooperation costs. Model 2 summarizes all forms
of stroke-specific bundled-payments that cover an episode
of care. Respondents mentioned three sub-variants; a) cov-
ering the complete stroke service, b) covering only ele-
ments of the stroke service such as the rehabilitation
phase, or the chronic phase, and c) covering all costs for a
pre-defined period (e.g. 6 or 12 months). Model 3 and 4
are financing models that provide payments unrelated to
stroke-diagnosis. In Model 3, a bundled payment for all
chronic care is created; providers receive similar bundled
payment for a patient with for example COPD, diabetes or
a stroke. Model 4 refers to population-based payments. In
this payment system, a pre-defined region receives a
budget, based on general or disease-specific epidemio-
logical data, and this budget should cover all care provided
by the providers in that region.
Care providers in general came up with mechanisms
such as Model 1 and 2, while insurers and experts gener-
ally discussed solutions resembling Model 3 and 4.
b) Entitlement to reimbursement
Apart from the financing model, respondents also re-
ferred to the problems with the current entitlement used
in health care; the number of care activities preformed.
Most respondents thought that rewarding the volume of
services is an undesirable method in health care, as it
leads to a focus on production instead of quality of care.
Respondents mentioned to finance care-outcomes in-
stead, as in a pay-for-performance system. Suggested en-
titlements were; i) performances, ii) quality of care, iii)
patient satisfaction or iv) achieved health.
“You could perhaps reward physicians based on the
fact whether health gain was achieved. In this way,
you reward the provision of a service, but only if there
has been a gain in health. If the patient didn’t benefit
from the service, what did you contribute then? I think
you shouldn’t be paying something then. Of course it is
very difficult to implement a system like this.” [expert]
It goes without saying that a change of entitlement has
large implications and an extensive impact on reimburse-
ment policies.
Question 3: Challenges in the implementation of a more
integrated financing mechanism
To generate more knowledge on how financing mecha-
nisms can become less fragmented and more integrated,
we asked the respondents what would be challenges in the
development of a more integrated financing mechanism
Figure 1 Financing models mentioned by the respondents. In the first model, providers receive on top of individual fee-for-service payments
a joined cooperation fee. Model 2 includes three different models for bundled-payment for stroke providers. In Model 3, payment is unrelated to
stroke-diagnosis and a bundled payment for all chronic care is provided. The fourth model describes population-based financing only for stroke
care, or for all care delivered.
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by the respondents; foundations of the financing system,
patient population, co-morbidity, clinical pathways, re-
sponsibility, differences among stroke services and evidence.
Each theme is discussed below.
a) Foundations of the financing system
Respondents mentioned that the foundations of the fi-
nancing system in health care in the Netherlands do not
facilitate an integrated financing mechanism. Examples
given were that i) there are different macro budgets (e.g.
one for primary care and one for hospital care) and a
stroke service overlaps these separate budgets and ii) the
system of regulated competition does not promote inte-
gration of services.
“Everything that you organise in a horizontal fashion,
such as stroke services, does not fit into the current
system in which we pay for every discipline separately.
These are problems which are not so easily solved.”
[expert]
In the current healthcare system of regulated competition,
healthcare providers as well as insurers are expected to
compete with each other. Several stakeholders considered
this system to be inappropriate for integrated care;
“Cooperation and regulated competition are in each
other’s way. We want the best of both worlds, optimal
quality and low cost, and we think that we canachieve that via regulated competition. I think it is
safe to say that that is an illusion. Especially in
healthcare.” [expert]b) Patient population
Several respondents mentioned that it would be difficult
to design one method of payment for stroke care, as the
patient population is very diverse.
“There are patients who have almost completely
recovered after one week, and there are patients who
will be severely handicapped for the next years. It is
unclear when is the earliest moment to have a good
prognosis for this specific patient, his care trajectory
and his needs”. [manager]
Furthermore, there are no objective measures available
that indicate the needs of the patient at an early stage.
This creates problems between several providers who
compete for the same patient, and this also results in situ-
ations where patients are placed in suboptimal facilities.c) Co-morbidity
Most of the experts and insurers responded that it is
likely that the number of patients with co-morbidity will
increase, and separate financing based on a condition
might not be optimal for them. For this group of patients, a
different type of integrated financing can be more suitable.
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Maybe we end up with chain-care for every chronic
disease, and then there will be patients who are in 3
different programs at the same time. We become too
specialised in everything, which eventually leads to
coordination issues.” [expert]
d) Clinical pathways
In addition to differences between patients, the clinical
pathways that patients follow can also differ greatly.
There are different possible endpoints in the chain of
services, and it is unclear when the stroke service as a
whole starts and ends. The great number of different
care providers who are involved with stroke care, com-
bined with all the possible clinical pathways complicates
defining one clear path and attaching a financial figure
to this.
“Care for stroke patients is very diffuse care; sometimes
there are more than 15 different care providers
involved.” [insurer]
e) Responsibility and accountability
The issue of responsibility was mentioned several times
by respondents. They stated that currently, everyone is
responsible for their part of the stroke service instead of
the end product, or the overall care for the patient.
“The responsibility of a medical specialist for the
total process is limited. As soon as the patient
moves on to the next part of the chain, then the
physician looses the patient. The money also stops,
so there is no incentive to keep track of the
patient.” [manager]
When the financing would be more integrated, it is un-
clear for respondents who should have the final respon-
sibility over the stroke service, and who should receive
the money for a patient.
“I think I would only enter such a financial
cooperation if I can be the main contractor. I realize
that I am saying this out of a fear to get insufficient
resources, instead of being confident that we are also a
vital part of the chain, and the we will be rewarded
accordingly.” [manager]
f) Differences among stroke services
The existing stroke services in the Netherlands are in
different stages of development, which, according to the
respondents, complicates designing one method of pay-
ment. Some services have clear agreements and struc-
tures and could benefit from an integrated financing
mechanism, while for a stroke service that is still indevelopment a simple cooperation fee would be the best
option. In addition, not all stroke services have a similar
provider structure (e.g. some include only one nursing
home, while others have three) and in some regions or
in large cities it is more complicated to have clear care
chains between fixed providers.
At the same time, some respondents argued that there
should remain space for stroke services to organise
themselves in the way they want.
“Don’t try to make blueprints for the organisation or
financing of the stroke service. I think that it’s OK
when they choose to be a loose network instead of a
fixed one. But that also doesn’t fit within the existing
system.” [expert]
g) Evidence
The final point made by respondents was the lack of evi-
dence on the impact of integrated financing on cost-
containment. In general, the respondents agreed that
improving the financing would result in better quality of
care, but respondents were divided in their opinions
whether integrated financing lead to more expensive or
less expensive care.
Discussion
Our thematic analysis shows that the current fee-for-
service system, according to the respondents, does not
provide the right incentives for the integration of stroke
care. A number of solutions and different financing
models were mentioned by the respondents, but there
was no consensus amongst them. Several challenges,
related to general factors (e.g. the foundations of the
financing system and the issue of co-morbidity), or stroke-
specific factors (e.g. diverse patient population and non-
uniformity of patient pathways) were mentioned regarding
the implementation of a more integrated financing mech-
anism for stroke care.
International comparison
The finding that fee-for-service systems do not provide
the right incentives for improving quality and efficiency
in health care has been recognized by others as well
[5,15-17]. In our study, the respondents did not agree
amongst each other about the best alternative for the
fee-for-service system. Disagreement is also found in the
literature. Evidence on pay-for-performance programs
for instance seems to depend to a great extent on the
specific circumstances and situations of the institutions
involved [15,18].
The respondents in our study came up with several
suggestions for alternative financing mechanisms for
stroke care (presented in Figure 1). There have been
financial experiments performed in different groups
Tummers et al. BMC Health Services Research 2013, 13:127 Page 8 of 10
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/13/127of chronic patients for several of the proposed pay-
ment systems. If we look at those experiments, can
we predict the effect of using these systems instead
of fee-for-service?
An experiment in Germany for instance, has provided
positive evidence for implementation of cooperation fees
[19]. In this experiment, sickness funds received higher
payments when they set up certified disease manage-
ment programs and induce patients to enrol while pro-
viders were able to receive additional funding if they
established integrated care projects. After four years of
implementation, a study reported better medical out-
comes and significant lower overall costs for diabetes
patients enrolled in a disease management program com-
pared to usual care [20].
In the Netherlands, the first experiments with bundled
payments for diabetes care have yielded mixed results
[21]. Bundled payments in theory rewards providers who
have lower costs while penalizing higher-cost providers.
In the United States, bundled payments are promoted as
the most promising opportunity to control health care
spending while encouraging high quality [6,8]. But in ac-
cordance with our findings, Davis [17] pointed out that
the problem with bundled payments lies in assigning ac-
countability for care across different settings and over
time. Care patterns for stroke patients are highly dis-
persed, there is a lack of continuity in the physician-
patient relationship and many different professionals
are involved.
Experiments with population-based financing or
global payments have been performed in Germany in
the Gesundes Kinzigtal experiment [22]. Here, a re-
gional management network together with a phys-
ician network and two insurance companies have set
up a population-based financing system that is com-
bined with shared-savings. Results so far have shown
a reduction in costs of the Kinzigtal region compared
to other regions, but future studies have yet to con-
clude that the decreased costs are indeed due to popula-
tion health gain. Population-based financing for stroke
care in the Netherlands and elsewhere has to be tried out
before introduced nationwide. Both results in literature
and experiments show mixed effects on the end goal: im-
proving quality of care and reducing costs per patient.
The priority now is to experiment with several modes of
integrated financing on a small scale, before large national
changes will be made.
Policy implications
Despite the challenges and problems mentioned by the
participants, there have been significant improvements
in the organisation of stroke care in the Netherlands in
the last ten years, without any financial innovations
[11]. These developments however have not occurredin every stroke service to the same extent, and also
not as fast as is thought necessary to deal with the fi-
nancial constraints and the rapidly aging population.
Therefore, it is important now to move beyond care
innovations and to look into the options for financial
reforms.Strengths and limitations
The strengths of our study include the purposive sam-
pling strategy from different stakeholder groups; in this
way we ensured that multiple perspectives were captured
through in-depth interviews of highly knowledgeable in-
formants from the five stakeholder groups. The sample
included those directly involved in integrated stroke care,
and those who were knowledgeable about, but not directly
involved in the day-to-day work of stroke services.
Anonymisation ensured that respondents felt free to share
their own personal opinions. The semi-structured inter-
view technique allowed issues to be explored in a flexible
manner. Also, respondents were free to raise any issue that
they felt were relevant to the topic under investigation. As
a result, it is believed that the information gathered was
reflective of genuine concerns and views. Since the re-
spondents were not familiar with the interviewer, we be-
lieve that the potential influence of the researchers on
data collection is kept minimal. All researchers were in-
volved in analysis and interpretation of the data to ensure
that the conclusions accurately reflect the collected opin-
ions and views of the participants.
The main limitation is that we did not include care-
givers in the group of patient respondents. Inclusion of
this group could have provided additional information.
Another limitation could be that the research is performed
in the Dutch context, and therefore less applicable to
other countries. However, we believe that the Dutch case
could be interesting for others because the Dutch system
is a fragmented fee-for-service system, which is found in
many other countries. Most of the results of this research
are specifically applicable to integrated stroke care. How-
ever, many of the issues raised regarding stroke care are
also applicable for financial and organisational issues in
other types of integrated care.Conclusions
This study has provided new knowledge on stakeholder
perception of the effect of payment systems and financial
incentives on cooperation processes, quality of care and
cost-containment in integrated stroke care. According to
our findings, the current fee-for-service system does not
provide the right incentives for the integration of stroke
care. It is now necessary to experiment with the different
models of financing for integrated stroke care, and report
proper cost-effectiveness analyses of the experiments.
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the optimal models may take place.
Appendix. Topic guide semi-structured interviews
– Short introduction by interviewer
– Short introduction of interviewee including:– Connection to stroke care
– (If applicable) short description of the integrated
stroke chain interviewee is involved in
– Personal or institutional opinion on integrated
(stroke) care
– Connection to financing of healthcareCurrent financing system
– Impact on quality of stroke care
– Impact on content of stroke care
– Issues with current financing system
– Possible solutions
Ideal situation
– How do you think integrated (stroke) care should be
financed? (probe for detailed answers)
– What should ideal care for stroke patients look like
– Areas for improvement within the existing
integrated stroke care
– What are the areas in which improvements can be
made specifically regarding quality and efficiency of
integrated stroke care?
Cooperation
– How can/should cooperation be promoted within
stroke care
– Is there a role for financing/incentives
If applicable:
– Agreements/deals made between care institutions
and with healthcare insurers regarding quality/
quantity/efficiency of care
– Managerial perspective: what are the current
issues regarding stroke care and the financing of
stroke care
– Should healthcare insurers be involved in the
development and financing of integrated stroke care,
and if so, what should be their task?
– Ministry of Healthcare: experiences with other
integrated care programs.
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